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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2135 
___________ 
 
BI JUAN LIN,  
                                                                             Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-079-707) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 25, 2013 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed November 14, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Bi Juan Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for 
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) March 20, 2013 decision denying 
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her second motion to reopen her removal proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Much of the background of this case is summarized in our prior decision denying 
Lin’s petition for review challenging the BIA’s final order of removal issued in 
September 2009.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 405 F. App’x 683, 683-85 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam).  For the purposes of our analysis here, we need only summarize the events that 
have taken place since our decision. 
 In August 2011, Lin moved the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings.  She 
argued, inter alia, that country conditions in China had changed with respect to her 
previously-rejected, family-planning-based claims for asylum, withholding of removal, 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The BIA denied that motion 
in May 2012, and Lin did not petition for review of that decision. 
 In October 2012, Lin filed a second motion to reopen with the BIA, again alleging 
that country conditions in China had changed.  This time, she claimed, inter alia, that she 
was now a practicing Christian, that she had been baptized in 2010, and that she would 
join an underground Christian church in China if forced to return there.  She further 
alleged that her attendance at such a church would result in her being “arrested and 
detained” by the Chinese government.  In light of these allegations, she sought to reapply 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 
 On March 20, 2013, the BIA denied Lin’s second motion to reopen.  In addressing 
Lin’s religion-based claim, the BIA began by explaining that she “has not sufficiently 
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demonstrated that the Chinese government is aware of her actions in this country.”  (A.R. 
at 3.)  Next, the BIA observed that Lin’s evidence from China, including a letter to “Bi 
Juan sister,” had not been authenticated in any manner.  Then, the BIA noted that Lin’s 
baptism did not constitute evidence of changed country conditions in China.  Lastly, the 
BIA explained that it 
cannot find that [Lin’s] documentation establishes changed 
country conditions or circumstances in China since [her] 
hearing.  [Lin’s] country condition evidence may represent a 
level of deterioration in the toleration of religious freedom in 
China, but we do not find that she has demonstrated that 
conditions have changed, for purposes of 8 C.F.R.  
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), since [her] hearing in 2008. 
 
(Id. at 4 (citation omitted).) 
 Lin now petitions for review of the BIA’s March 20, 2013 decision.  We have 
jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
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II. 
 An alien generally must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of 
the final order of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  There is no such time limit, 
however, if the alien’s motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the 
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 In addition to Lin’s argument relating to her religion-based claim, her second motion to 
reopen also included argument relating to her family-planning-based claim.  The BIA 
found this latter argument unpersuasive, and Lin does not challenge that aspect of the 
BIA’s decision in her brief.  Accordingly, that issue has been waived.  See Laborers’ Int’l 
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).  
However, to the extent that the Government contends that Lin’s challenge to the denial of 
her religion-based claim for reopening has also been waived and/or is unexhausted, that 
contention lacks merit.  Furthermore, to the extent that the Government contends that 
certain sub-issues relating to Lin’s religion-based claim have been waived, we need not 
decide the question of waiver there because, as we explain in Section II, Lin has not 
established that the BIA’s decision should be disturbed.    
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country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence 
is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the 
previous proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).2  The “previous proceeding” refers 
to the hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253 
(3d Cir. 2006), and a change in country conditions is “material” only if it would change 
the outcome of the alien’s application for relief.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 
496 (3d Cir. 2012).  “We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 
discretion and review its underlying factual findings related to the motion for substantial 
evidence.”  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks 
omitted).  A denial of reopening constitutes an abuse of discretion only if it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 Having carefully considered the record and the parties’ arguments, we cannot 
conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Lin’s second motion to reopen.  
That motion devoted little space to Lin’s religion-based claim, and none of her argument 
there explained how country conditions in China had changed since her 2008 hearing 
before the IJ.  The BIA ultimately determined that Lin had failed to establish changed 
country conditions in China, and her brief here does not cite evidence or otherwise 
demonstrate how the record supports a contrary conclusion. Although she appears to 
claim that the BIA’s statement that the evidence “may represent a level of deterioration in 
the toleration of religious freedom in China,” (A.R. at 4), is inconsistent with its 
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 Although the regulation cited by the BIA — 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) — does not 
track § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) verbatim, the two provisions reflect the same standard. 
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conclusion that she failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, we see no such 
inconsistency.  Rather, we read this aspect of the BIA’s decision to mean that the “level 
of deterioration” that may be reflected by the record is simply not significant enough to 
be material (i.e., it is not significant enough to change the outcome of Lin’s application 
for relief).
3
  We recognize that the BIA could have been more explicit in its reasoning 
and discussed the background evidence more thoroughly; however, we cannot say that it 
abused its discretion, particularly in light of the unpersuasive argument and evidence that 
Lin put before it. 
 Although Lin also challenges the BIA’s authentication ruling, we need not address 
it because the documents that the BIA deemed unauthenticated, like the rest of the record, 
fail to show that country conditions in China have changed since her 2008 hearing.  
Accordingly, and in light of the above, we will deny Lin’s petition for review.  
 
 
                                              
3
 To the extent that Lin’s evidence indeed suggests a “level of deterioration” in the 
tolerance of religious freedom in China, it appears that deterioration started before her 
2008 hearing.  (See, e.g., A.R. at 108-09.) 
